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THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER*
RiCHARD A. FAL't
The Banco Nacioital de Cuba v. Sabbatino1 litigation has encouraged
speculation about the proper role of domestic courts in the international
legal order.2 In this article the accent is upon the proper response of a
court in the United States to the argument that the official action of a
foreign government is, in some sense, illegal. Such a setting emphasizes
the manner in which legal authority is and should be allocated between
the executive and judicial branches of government in an international law
case, i.e., one involving the review of a foreign act of state. This inquiry
may help to create a framework of thought that permits a more informed
judgment about the most favorable type of participation by an American
domestic court in the international legal order.'
I. SOME IssuEs STATED
The widespread controversy about the role of domestic courts in in-
ternational law cases centers primarily upon the extent to which courts
should be independent of executive supervision in cases that may impinge
upon the conduct of foreign relations. A second disagreement concerns
the stability of substantive rules of international law in the broad area of
state responsibility for injury to alien interests. This article takes a par-
tisan position by supporting judicial independence and by assuming,
though not here contending, that many of the traditional rules governing
state responsibility are now obsolete.'
* I wish to thank Barbara Yount for the customary excellence of her editorial
assistance and the Center of International Studies of Princeton University for provid-
ing me with its fine research facilities.
f Associate Professor of International Law, Department of Politics, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; Faculty Associate, Center of Inter-
national Studies, Princeton University.
1. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 378 (1964), affirming
193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
2. See especially Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New
Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. Cxi. L. REv. 63 (1936) ; Domke & Baade, Nationalization
of Foreign-Owned Property and the Act of State Doctrine-Two Speeches, 1963 DUKE
L.J. 296; Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square; The Second Circuit and Sabbatino,
8 ViLL. L. Rzv. 155 (1963) ; Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations,
23 U. PiTT. L. REv. 881 (1962) ; Stevenson, The Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward
and Two Steps Back, 57 Am. J. IxT'L L. 97 (1963).
3. A more complete attempt to develop a framew6rk for thought about these
problems is contained in the forthcoming book FALK, DOXESTIC COURTS AND INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, to be published in June 1964 by the Syracuse University Press.
4. For an excellent analysis of the question of substantive obsolescence in the
Sabbatino context, see Dawson & Weston, supra note 2.
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Analysis of these issues is confined to the perspective of the United
States, and for several reasons such a narrowing of perspective deprives
the analysis of generality. The character of American political institu-
tions and traditions undoubtedly influences the interpretation. The fed-
eral nature of the United States has led to the idea of dual sovereignty
for domestic governance; this creates special difficulties for the United
States (and for other federal states with non-authoritarian political struc-
tures) insofar as the maintenance of unified policies is considered de-
sirable and necessary for a state that participates in international affairs
as a sovereign actor. In addition, the traditional doctrine of separation of
powers causes Americans to have a set of expectations about the character
of judicial independence that, if disappointed, undermines their respect
for court proceedings and for the sanctity of law in general. Executive
interference in the activities of domestic courts because a legal dispute
involves the application of rules of international law is an evident discrim-
ination against this kind of law-a discrimination that might be expected
to weaken public confidence in the viability of international law. It is
true, of course, that the executive branch is responsible for the conduct
of foreign relations, and that foreign relations may be affected by do-
mestic litigation. But should the dictates of foreign relations dominate
a private dispute between litigants seeking a vindication of their legal
rights by an appeal to rules of private and public international law?
If the litigation involves a public prosecution by the forum state,
quite a different issue is presented since a discretionary element enters
into the decision to prosecute and a punitive element attaches to a convic-
tion. Therefore, if the defendant in a criminal prosecution is closely
identified with the activities or policies of a foreign state, the domestic
government needs the authority to terminate the case. But does this
suggest that a private party who is injured by the action of a foreign
government should be prevented from a remedy in law to the extent that
the requisites of jurisdiction can be satisfied? If so, why? A refusal
to allow prosecution of the civil remedy on the basis of 'diplomatic con-
siderations undermines the basic dignity of individual rights, for then
the domestic authority is exercised to subordinate private rights to some
hypothetical public interest. Especially in a democratic society, it is im-
portant to preserve the private sector and to resist the encroachments of
government. Access to courts is symbolic of the right of a free individual.
The paternalistic claim that the government can protect its citizens better
if they are denied a judicial remedy in an international law case is not
only unnecessary, but undermines the effort to transform the law of
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nations into a law of mankind.'
Eventually we need to disentangle what is American from what is
universal about the role of domestic courts in the international legal sys-
tem. Such an operation must await, however, detailed comparative studies
of constitutional tradition, political reality and public expectation in the
major domestic societies of the world.6 In the interim an assessment of
the role of domestic courts must necessarily remain partial. Neverthe-
less, the argument in favor of judicial autonomy can be advanced from an
American perspective both to uphold domestic values and traditions and
to advance the cause of world legal order. This is not intended as an en-
dorsement of a provincial outlook. Instead it is contended that courts
should construe the character of international law from a broadly non-
national perspective.
There are two kinds of autonomy: the autonomy of the judicial in-
stitutions within the framework of the domestic political system, and the
autonomy of the rules of international law within the law-applying con-
text. The first form of autonomy without the second may be less satis-
factory than the elimination of both. A failure to achieve the second
form, the impartial application of existing rules of international law,
causes the judiciary to be politicized and transforms adjudicative pro-
ceedings into ex parte argument. This failure is probably more damag-
ing to the development of international law than the exercise of discre-
tionary control by the executive over the courts in a frankly political
fashion.7 If a domestic court construes controversial rules of interna-
tional law to accord with national values, courts become politicized by
their own independent action. This causes the content of international
law to be more responsive to national interests, leads foreign parties with
antagonistic values to expect and receive unfair treatment in a domestic
5. Such a transformation has been suggested, discerned and commended with ad-
mirable clarity in JENKS, THE ColamoN LAW OF MANKIND 1-22 (1958).
6. A multi-national inquiry of this sort would allow us to appraise the prospects
for integrating domestic courts into a global set of institutions administering a common
legal system according to common principles. National societies that have completely
centralized political power and have subordinated all law to the demands of politics
would not be very likely to permit their domestic courts to develop an autonomous tradi-
tion in cases involving international law.
7. Throughout this article a contrast is made between law and politics that can
be easily misunderstood. The plea for judicial independence and the arguments against
political decision-making are intended to emphasize the difference between executive
and judicial behavior. However, it is certainly not suggested at this late day that
judges can or should decide difficult cases without recourse to policy considerations,
or that judges are immune to political pressures generated by national passions. Cer-
tainly not! It is a matter of degree. Courts are normally foreclosed, especially if
they are so instructed, and refrain from giving expression to temporary policies, whereas
the executive, especially in foreign policy as developed in the American tradition, is
frankly pragmatic and ad hoc, making the best of the combination of immediate interests.
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court, and makes judicial outcome depend more upon the values and out-
look of the forum than upon the uniform impact of rules of international
law on the controversy. That pattern neither renders domestic justice
nor promotes international law. Thus, the two forms of autonomy are
inextricably bound up with one another in an assessment of the activities
of domestic courts.
The issues governing autonomy combine problems of allocating legal
competence with problems of construing substantive rules. The initial
question is not what is the governing rule but rather who shall supply it;
the executive has a primary interest in reaching settlements of a category
of disputes involving a conflict of interests among states, whereas the
judiciary has a primary commitment to the solution of a specific dispute.
To reach an executive settlement, the application of legal rules is only one
of several elements that enters into inter-governmental negotiations. No
one denies that the executive should use diplomatic techniques to resolve
international disputes, or that diplomacy which must search for a settle-
ment according to law is often likely to be futile and dogmatic. Yet
recognition of a proper sphere of diplomatic action does not and should
not infer that the judicial outcome of specific controversies should be sup-
pressed to avoid interference with the pursuit of diplomatic remedies.
The executive branch over-generalized in its brief in the Sabbatino case
and argued that a diplomatic settlement is more effective than a judicial
settlement-as if one prohibited the other.'
In what way is executive disposition more effective? There are two
sets of interests, each of which is valid within its proper sphere: (1) the
public interest in reaching a settlement on a state-to-state basis, the effect
of which settlement might also be of indirect benefit to a class of private
claimants, and (2) a private interest in having courts available to deter-
mine alleged infringements of individual rights. An assumption that the
public interest in a general settlement outweighs the private interest is
unwarranted unless one is prepared to dismiss as irrelevant, or at least as
trivial, the legal protection that is given to individuals by the rules of
international law. The material satisfacti6n of a maximum number
of claimants may not be the broadest interest to be served. The judicial
8. The primary and most satisfactory way to deal with foreign acts of state
which violate international law is the exercise of diplomacy. In the absence
of an international tribunal with power to settle controversies arising from
sovereign acts, it seems evident that the effective and important means for
dealing with acts of sovereign states which violate international law is not
through sporadic American judicial decisions but through the exercise of diplo-
matic power by the Executive.
Brief for United States as amicus curiae, p. 28, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 378 (1964), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAI. MATERIALS 1009, 1018 (1963).
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opportunity to reinforce the expectations of private parties that disputes
will be settled according to international legal standards serves a general
interest that outweighs the special interests of a class of claimants dis-
advantaged by the default by a foreign government in a particular in-
stance. Moreover, a judicial settlement exhibits the role of law, as dis-
tinct from politics, in the struggle to create a stable system of interna-
tional remedies, the process of which is valuable as pedagogy.
In a domestic law context, it would not occur to anyone to foreclose
a normal judicial remedy available to individuals in order to improve the
prospects for general settlement. The effort of the federal government
to improve the status of the Negro in Southern states might benefit from
federal-state diplomacy, but no one would contend that the dictates of the
diplomatic method should be allowed to foreclose the pursuit of a remedy
by an individual Negro, even if such a remedy might exacerbate federal-
state relations to the extent that a general settlement would be hampered.
The President's responsibility for supervising federal-state relations does
not generate an incidental power to interfere with the ordinary function-
ing of federal courts. Thus, why does the President's responsibility for
foreign affairs generate an incidental power to prevent normal adjudica-
tion? No discernible functional need is served by the assumption of such
an incidental power.
II. THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
THE PRECEDENTS
Properly construed, the earlier Supreme Court decisions affirming
executive prerogatives in the area of foreign relations are not inconsistent
with the advocacy of judicial independence.9 United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.'" concerns the extent of discretion that Congress
may vest in the President to control shipments of private arms from the
United States to parties engaged in a foreign war. As the Supreme Court
correctly affirmed, "in this vast external realm, with its important, deli-
cate, and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as the representative of the nation."" This general observation
9. The responsibility of the executive for the conduct of foreign affairs has been
frequently affirmed by the courts as a guiding principle. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 29S U.S. 238, 295 (1935) (and cases there cited) ; Mackenzie v. Howe, 239 U.S. 299,
311 (1915). However, the existence of the principle does not determine the scope of the
executive competence. The two principal cases considered in this section support a
limitation of scope by reference to the functional requirements of the executive under-
taking.
10. 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
11. Id. at 319.
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was related to the functional needs of the executive for discretion in this
kind of factual situation:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our interna-
tional relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrass-
ment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, con-
gressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often
accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domes-
tic affairs alone involved.'
2
The opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland went on to stress the President's
need to rely on "confidential sources of information" to assess the foreign
situation, the disclosure of which might be harmful. Since the issue in
Curtiss-Wright was the governmental regulation of American business to
prevent unintended involvement of the nation in foreign wars, either by
establishing an American "presence" on one side by the introduction of
United States' arms or by interfering with a national aim to restore peace
to the area, as a precedent the case suggests that the Constitution allows
the legislature to confer wide discretion on the executive when the subject
matter, by its very nature, involves foreign relations. But it must be
observed that this case presents the extreme instance-the relation be-
tween the United States and a foreign war. It teaches us little about the
extent to which, if at all, the executive power over foreign relations im-
pinges upon the normal scope of judicial function in civil litigation in
international law cases.
The other important Supreme Court case, Chicago & S. Air Lines v.
Waterman S. S. Corp.," likewise confirms the authority of the executive
to carry out the specific foreign relations duties that are entrusted to it.
In Waterman the issue involved presidential authority to approve certifi-
cates of convenience and necessity issued by the CAB to foreign carriers
or for foreign routes. As in Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the reliance of the President upon intelligence reports to exercise his
responsibility of assuring that CAB action accords with national security.
The combination of administrative and executive action is declared un-
reviewable by the courts, for "it would be intolerable that courts, without
the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret."'" Furthermore,
12. Id at 320. This conclusion is, perhaps, stated in rhetoric that is unnecessarily
sweeping, given the character of the case.
13. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
14. Id. at 111.
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these are "decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither apti-
tude, facilities nor responsibility and which [have] long been held to be-
long in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or
inquiry."" An appropriate claim of executive preemption is raised by
this case, since the nature of the disputed question-the propriety of the
grant or the denial of the certificate--cannot be decided by judicial tech-
niques without appraising the President's judgment about national se-
curity. But does the Waterman holding militate against our affirmation
of judicial independence in civil litigation in international law cases? The
disputed issue in those cases is quite susceptible to judicial resolution since
it requires only an appraisal of the legality or legal effect of a foreign
government's conduct. There is only an indirect and most uncertain con-
nection between the civil case and the conduct of foreign relations. From a
technical viewpoint, the domestic court is competent; no political ingredi-
ent is embedded in that kind of case.
Of course, trends in world politics may make a judicial act relevant
to foreign policy. It may be desirable in one situation to avoid a rebuff
to France, whereas in another it may be desirable to rebuff Cuba; there-
fore, an assurance of judicial support may promote the achievement of
executive objectives. But this kind of executive interest is based on
ad hoc considerations of foreign policy, and if it is allowed to influence
judicial behavior, courts will be nationalized without serving any general
executive function or without taking account of limits upon judicial com-
petence. There is no regulative principle, as distinct from ad hoc pres-
sure, to justify the executive claim or to explain judicial abdication. In
this sense, the executive claim is unlike Curtiss-Wright or Waterman.
The tradition of judicial deference to ad hoc executive policy can be
traced to the influence of United States v. Pink,6 a principal case stand-
15. Ibid.
16. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The Pink case involved a determination of the effect of
diplomatic recognition upon the disposition of some Russian assets located in New York,
which the Soviet government had attempted to confiscate by extra-territorial decree.
To reestablish good relations, the Soviet Union agreed in the Litvinov Assignment to
assign its claims to American-located assets to the United States government. The latter
was then expected to use them to satisfy American claims against the Soviet government.
By normal rules of conflict of laws, a state court in New York had decided that the Soviet
decree, because of its confiscatory nature, was unable to affect ownership of assets
physically present in the United States; there being nothing to assign, the assignee
acquired nothing more than the assignor possessed. The Supreme Court reversed on broad
grounds, stressing executive supremacy in the area of foreign affairs and a consequentjudicial duty to carry out the executive will. In Pink this conception of executive-
judicial relations was used to hold that, in view of the objectives of our recognition
policy, the Litvinov Assignment must be held to transfer the New York assets to the
federal government. This gave the Soviet confiscatory decree retroactive validity;
such validity, ironically, could only be reached because the Soviet government was un-
recognized at the time that it acted. This illustrates the extent of judicial subservience.
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ing for the subordination of judicial outcome to the foreign policy of the
moment. While it is proper for judicial deference to arise solely as a
consequence of the structural characteristics and functional requirements
of the executive's responsibility for foreign relations, it is improper for
judicial deference to be a consequence of the vagaries of shifting pat-
terns of foreign policy. In the latter instance, the court can and would
decide the issues in dispute, permitting the executive disposition to manip-
ulate judicial behavior to serve a temporary national interest. To hallow
the Pink tradition is to erode the prestige and role of domestic courts in
the international legal system. The whole problem of executive-judicial
relations in international law cases cannot be satisfactorily resolved with-
out a reexamination, and an eventual repudiation, of the thinking re-
flected in Pink.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
Domestic courts necessarily function as national institutions and as
agents of international legal order. This much is non-controversial; the
controversy arises when, as in Sabbctino, it becomes necessary to attribute
significance to the reality of this dual membership in a specific instance,
especially one in which contradictory lines of action emanate from na-
tional and international sources of legal authority. Then one must choose
and by choosing identify which is the paramount affiliation. There is no
way to compromise or otherwise avoid the thorny issue of paramountcy.
The nature of the contradiction can be illustrated by the conflict be-
tween the conduct of foreign policy and the application of a rule of in-
ternational law. From the perspective of the national government, do-
mestic courts are subordinate instruments of policy in the area of foreign
relations; the executive branch has the chief responsibility and possesses
the necessary authority to act on behalf of the nation. From the per-
spective of the international system, a court should apply rules of inter-
national law as independently and as consistently as it does rules arising
from any other source of law. Domestic courts are in a position to de-
velop international law, to manifest respect for international law, and to
demonstrate that normal standards of judicial independence are just as
operative in an international law case as in a domestic case. The use-
fulness of domestic courts as international institutions, that is, as insti-
tutions responsible for upholding international law and for displaying it
as a common system of law peculiar to no single state, depends on the
capacity of these courts to withstand internal political influence when
See also Cardozo, The Authority in Internal Law of Intenzational Treaties: The Pink
Case, 13 SYRACUsE L. RPEv. 544 (1962).
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confronted with an issue of international law. To the extent that domes-
tic courts set aside the normal application of international law to serve
the foreign relations of the national government, they confirm the cyni-
cal perception of international law as subordinate to or as a rationalization
of national policy. In addition, if domestic courts act as a branch of the
national government, their capacity to declare and develop international
law is impaired. The law-giver must not appear partisan.
Yet, can the executive afford to have a domestic court impose its
provincial views of the character of international law and relations upon
legal controversies having important consequences for our foreign policy?
The action of a domestic court is often perceived as the action of
the nation as a whole, especially by those foreign nations domestic-
ally unaccustomed to an independent judiciary. Thus, if the court in state
X renders a decision hostile to the interests of Y, then Y is likely to re-
gard the judicial conduct in X as tantamount to a hostile foreign policy
decision, a decision perhaps calling for reprisal by Y, and certainly pro-
ductive of tension. It is reasonable to maintain that, given the delicacy
of the political balance in contemporary international politics, the execu-
tive needs the authority to control the behavior of courts.
The recent (February 1964) incident involving the seizure of Cuban
fishing vessels on the ground that they were improperly present in the
territorial waters of the United States illustrates the genuine problem that
is present. The seizure itself raised tensions and led Cuba to retaliate by
interfering with the normal water supply available to the United States'
base at Guantanamo. In turn, this hostile Cuban act led the United States
to discharge some of its Cuban employees at Guantanamo. Domestic
voices in the United States were heard advocating more drastic responses,
some urging a complete blockade of Cuba until Castro turned the water
back on, others demanding a forcible intervention to restore the water
supply. Premier Castro said that the normal supply would not be re-
stored until the fishermen and their vessels were set free. Convinced
after investigation that these vessels were being operated for fishing pur-
poses only and were not engaged in a mission that was hostile to the
United States, the Department of State apparently favored prompt release
of the vessels and crews.
That action might have terminated the crisis. Florida authorities,
however, wanted to prosecute these fishermen under a state statute mak-
ing it a crime to fish without a license in Florida's territorial waters, a
citizen of a communist state being ineligible to obtain a Florida license.
The federal government turned the Cubans over to Florida authorities,
enabling prosecution and conviction of the four boat captains. The ac-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion of the Florida courts might well have inflamed Cuban-American
relations in a manner that is contrary to the will and wisdom of the
State Department, although the federal decision to allow the Florida
prosecution must have discounted this possibility. Does not the federal
government need to retain the competence to withdraw such a case from
Florida courts?
In this instance the executive possessed the original competence to
deny court action because it had obtained custody over the prospective
defendants. The federal government could certainly have effectively re-
fused Florida's request since, in a criminal case where federal custody ex-
ists, initial executive control over the prosecution is assured. If instead
the incident had grown out of a state enforcement action, that is, had the
jurisdiction over the defendants and their vessels resulted from a Florida
seizure and prosecution, one can visualize that the problems posed by the
conflict between the United States' form of federalism and its foreign
relations are potentially very serious.
This kind of problem is created by the political context within which
any executive decision to prosecute is made. Since a criminal prosecution
is a matter of executive discretion, it is, therefore, properly construed as
an aspect of foreign relations. Whether a state with a federal system that
involves the decentralization of executive authority should develop a com-
petence to assure federal control is a special, although important, ques-
tion. It is probably not reasonable for us to expect foreign states to ac-
cept the autonomy of our federal units as an excuse for action to which
they object. On the other hand, the authority of the fifty states to apply
their own law to events within their jurisdiction is an essential attribute
of the federal system.
The incident involving Cuban fishing boats is interesting partly be-
cause it powerfully demonstrates why the executive might want and need
to exercise control over domestic litigation in order to properly execute
fundamental national policy in foreign affairs. There are special ele-
ments in the case, however, that require greater emphasis. First, the
illustration concerned a criminal prosecution, i.e., a public act of the prose-
cuting government, that is by its discretionary nature inevitably political
and thus reasonably construed as political by foreign governments. This
point becomes more evident when one recalls the reaction in the United
States to foreign criminal prosecutions of American servicemen, even
when those prosecutions occurred in friendly states. States are habitually
sensitive whenever their nations have been made defendants in a criminal
prosecution, and this sensitivity is accented if the prosecution seems mo-
tivated by hostility toward the nation to which the defendants owe al-
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legiance. If there is a political background to the prosecution, it then
often appears that the foreign state is the real defendant. In this regard
it is hard to imagine a seizure by the Coast Guard of Mexican fishing
vessels operating under circumstances similar to those of the Cuban ves-
sels, and it is almost inconceivable to suppose a Florida prosecution after
a federal willingness to release.
Second, by discriminating against certain foreign states on the basis
of their political system, the underlying Florida licensing law incorporates
a viewpoint toward international relations tantamount to the adoption of
a foreign policy for Florida. Here again, the federalistic structure of
the United States complicates the analysis. The Florida policy is not a
reason for restricting the role of domestic courts, however. Rather it is a
matter relating to the extent to which unified federal control is, can and
should be maintained over the fifty states in order to exclude them from
participating in the foreign policy-making function.
Lastly, the prosecution itself, when and if it takes place, does not
necessarily involve an issue of international law. It is certainly quite
possible for the defense to contend that ships traversing territorial waters
are not bound to obey the subnational laws of Florida and that, in any
event, the Florida licensing statute is illegal under an international rule
of non-discrimination and therefore unenforceable. To the extent that a
Florida prosecution involves arguments about the application of rules of
international law to a dispute, the case is correctly treated as one that
concerns the proper function of domestic courts.
IV. ARGUMENTS FAvORING EXECUTIVE PREEMPTION
An international law case is one in which the judicial outcome de-
pends at least in part upon a dispute over the application or character of
international law rules. If the suit was genuinely initiated by a private
party, the controversy presumably does not reflect a governmental deci-
sion to prosecute. Nevertheless, it may not resemble ordinary private
litigation; "complications" may arise. For example, an inconsistency may
arise between the diplomatic representations of the United States and the
determination of its domestic courts. If an American court finds that
an expropriating state need not always pay prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation, it is more difficult for the State Department to main-
tain the contrary position. Thus, it can be argued that judicial action
might prejudice diplomacy covering the same subject matter. Also it
could be urged that a court is less competent than the executive to inter-
pret rules of international law. Furthermore, since the executive must
necessarily take a position when disputes about international law arise,
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it may be both confusing and embarrassing to risk an inconsistent judicial
position. It can be contended with some force, therefore, that either
courts should be kept silent when a controversial rule of international law
is at stake, or they should interpret international law in accord with
executive will to the end that the judiciary and executive branches speak
with a single national voice in international law disputes. And finally,
in certain situations, Bahia de Nipe for example, the executive might want
to bargain a judicial release for a foreign favor; that is, the American
executive branch may wish to give up its jurisdiction over a foreign ship
in exchange for the return of United States' hi-jacked planes in foreign
possession." A recognition of executive paramountcy provides a bar-
gaining counter in international negotiations that can be valuable on cer-
tain occasions.
These considerations demonstrate that disadvantages may arise if
domestic courts achieve real independence in international law cases, and
that the executive may sometimes have good reason for seeking to re-
strain or manipulate domestic courts. Clearly, the conduct of foreign
relations might be adversely affected by the treatment accorded an inter-
national law case by a domestic court, but likewise our foreign relations
might be adversely affected by the investment policies of United States'
corporations conducting business abroad. This potential for adverse ef-
fects must be balanced against the potential for beneficial effects. In
weighing the balance, it is evident that one is faced with a problem of
scheduling utilities and arranging priorities. Is it more important to
encourage the independent operation of a domestic court or to assure the
executive control over activity that might influence the conduct of foreign
relations? In the final analysis, this question can be answered only by
a value judgment. An objective comparison of the net effect of judicial
autonomy versus executive control appears infeasible.
V. ARGUMENTS FAvORING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Despite the acknowledgment that values affect one's judgment about
the proper role of domestic courts in the international legal order, it is
possible to advance a supporting rationale for a judiciary that is inde-
pendent in non-criminal and non-primitive international law cases.'8
1. Purely international tribunals are not conveniently available for
the litigation of disputes about international law.
2. Respect for the claims of international law as a legal system is
lost if adjudication is made subservient to diplomacy.
17. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
18. Only a listing of the reasons is intended here.
440
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3. Domestic courts have an excellent opportunity to develop inter-
national law if they will be allowed to operate as independent tribunals.
4. The domestic location of the forum should normally not be
treated as an essential aspect of the controversy. The Sabbatino litigation
could just as easily have taken place in a foreign forum; some of the
cases testing the validity of the Iranian and Indonesian nationalization pro-
grams took place in domestic courts of countries that did not even have
an interest in the expropriated property. 9
5. The independence of the judiciary in international law cases is
one way to shatter the illusion that sovereignty allows a state to reconcile
its obligation to uphold international law with the promotion of its na-
tional interests. In fact, the depoliticalization of courts in international
law cases weakens the regressive notion that states are the only significant
actors in international relations.
6. An awareness by the general community of states of the inde-
pendence of the judiciary will by itself mitigate many of the burdens that
such independence imposes on the executive. Part of the need for execu-
tive control arises from the illusion abroad-especially in states that lack
independent political institutions and a system of intra-governmental
checks and balances-that executive control exists in fact, and that judi-
cial behavior is accordingly a product of executive will.
7. An independent judiciary preserves a private sector of inter-
national transactions that is not vulnerable to government control, and
thereby reists the trend toward totalization of the exercise of control over
human activity by the modern state. It is desirable to allow the state to
speak with several voices in foreign affairs if the effect is to resist the
tendency of the public sector to take over all private, non-national activi-
ties. Application of international law by domestic courts should satisfy
expectations created by law, rather than be made responsive to the needs
of world politics or foreign policy.
8. Domestic courts are in a better position, in part because of their
visibility and disciplined mode of operation, to resist domestic pressures
to apply international law in a partisan manner. Public opinion, legisla-
tive pressures and interest groups have more opportunity to influence
executive than judicial processes of decision-making.
19. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civil Tribunal of Venice, [1955]
Int'l L. Rep. 19; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitou Kosan Kabuskiki Karsha, [1953]
Int'l L. Rep. 312 (High Court of Tokyo) ; Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures
Before Foreign Courts, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960) (discussion of and excerpts from
the opinions of the District Court in Bremen and the Hanseatic Court of Appeals in N.V.
Verenigde Deli-Maatschapijen v. Deutsch-Indonesische Tabak-Handelsgesellschaft M.
r. H.). See also Baade, Indonesian Natiowalizatimo Measures Before Foreign Courts-
A Reply, 54 Aat. J. INT'L L. 801 (1960).
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9. Domestic courts can educate the public about the character and
importance of international law by writing opinions in this area, par-
ticularly if these opinions manifest a non-political approach to the inter-
pretation and application of rules of international law. Such communi-
cation may also help to induce the new states to accept international law
as a serious source of mutual constraint.
10. The dangers of the nuclear age make it desirable to take risks,
even to make sacrifices, in order to promote the growth of world legal
order. The constructive use of domestic courts encourages a fuller and
more responsible participation by nations in the international legal system.
VI. AFTER JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, THEN WHAT?
Suppose that domestic courts do liberate themselves from executive
constraints in private litigation involving the potential application of rules
of international law to the contested action of foreign governments. That
is, suppose a complete repudiation of the Pink tradition and an af firma-
tion of the need for judicial independence in international law cases occur.
Then what?
At first glance the effects of judicial independence appear trivial.
Adherence to the act of state doctrine requires a domestic court in the
United States to refrain from reviewing the validity of official action
taken by a foreign government.2" For the purposes of the litigation, the
foreign act of state must be treated as valid by a domestic court. Thus,
even though the executive branch does not instruct the court on what it
must do, the court by its own rules of deference is foreclosed from doing
anything.
Judicial independence does, however, make an important difference
in one respect. The executive loses the competence to suspend the opera-
tion of the act of state doctrine by writing a "Bernstein Letter."'" This
20. For a more complete discussion of the nature and scope of the act of state
doctrine, see Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts it the
International Legal Order: A Critique of Baico Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16
RUTGERs L. Rv. 1, 31-37 (1961) ; Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L.
635 (1959).
21. The idea of a Bernstein Letter arises from a series of cases dealing with Nazi
German acts of state. These acts of state took property without compensation from
Jewish owners. In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, S.A., 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand held that the act of state doctrine prevented a
domestic court from questioning the validity of the German confiscatory acts. A second
case involving similar facts, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaanscheu Stoom-
vaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d ir. 1949), also refused inquiry into the validity
of the challenged German acts of state until such inquiry was authorized by a letter sent
to the court by the Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954). The letter stated that it is "the policy of the Executive, with respect to claims
asserted in the United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation
in lieu thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution
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kind of executive competence, unrelated as it is to functional considera-
tions of the Curtis-Wright or Waterman variety, would approve the prac-
tice of allowing ad hoc foreign policy motives to influence judicial out-
comes. It is submitted that the requirements of judicial independence
necessitate a repudiation of the Bernstein doctrine,2 which is, in effect, a
corollary application of the Pink view of the duty of domestic courts to
implement foreign policy as it was being pursued by the executive.
This does not necessarily mean that there can be no exceptions to the
deference accorded by the act of state doctrine. It only means that the
exceptions must be judicially created and, hence, judicially justified by
reference to functional considerations. It has been advocated that the basis
for an exception should be the existence of universal consensus.2" This
leads to an interpretation of the external aspects of the act of state doc-
trine as a means of affirming the legitimate diversity of national conduct
for all activity for which a common standard was not supported by a con-
sensus. Such a view implies that the basis of obligations in international
law is primarily a reflection of community will and secondarily a reflec-
tion of national will. That is, if nations are in agreement, a foreign
state's conduct should be appraised by reference to the common standards;
if there is a significant degree of dissensus, a domestic court should treat
the disputed action of the foreign government as valid.
What makes for consensus is a difficult, but not impossible, deter-
mination. Evidence in support of or in opposition to normative standards
can be ascertained by national practice, doctrinal literature and claims, as
well as by the actions of states in international organizations, by the votes
and proceedings of scientific legal organizations and by an examination
of the technical literature. The discernment of consensus is most ap-
parent with respect to many of the problems of human rights law; the
discernment of dissensus is most salient with respect to the duty to com-
pensate aliens for expropriated property and, generally, with respect to the
law of state responsibility.
An insistence upon consensus as a basis of obligation in international
law takes account of the structure of international society. There are no
developed central legal organs able to change old law that conflicts
with new patterns of values. Therefore, law must be administered
in Germany . . . to relieve American courts from any exercise of their jurisdiction to
pass on the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." 20 STATE DE'T BULL. 592 (1949). On
the basis of this letter, the court in the second Bernstein case invalidated the German
acts of state and awarded the property to the complainant.
22. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1947).
23. See Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-
Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. Rxv. 231, 243-48 (1964).
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in accord with the national governmental structure that persists. The
dispersion of governmental institutions on the national level and the pat-
terns of effective control both affirm the territorial nature of law. In
the absence of an overwhelming consensus to the contrary, domestic
courts should accept the validity of the territorial acts of the foreign
government. The act of state doctrine can be easily adapted to this set
of recommendations, but the adaptation is not necessary and perhaps is
even deceptive.
More useful decisions might result if courts come to justify defer-
ence or its exceptions by offering a functional account in terms of legiti-
mate diversity and universal standards. One could dispense entirely with
the act of state doctrine, although it would be necessary to attach a pre-
sumption of validity to the act of the foreign government to show it
respect and thereby to restrain one's own courts from giving provincial
interpretations of the character of support available for the relevant rule
or rules of international law. The presumption would alert courts and
litigants to the need of support for rules of international law that trans-
cend the national outlook. In fact, it would be desirable to demonstrate
the absence of any support for the claim of right implicit in the chal-
lenged action of the foreign government. This kind of demonstration
would help to bring the dependence of international legal obligations up-
on a supporting consensus of national actors into sharper focus. If con-
sensus be absent, the presence of diversity is tantamount to a validation of
territorial law. Because international society lacks central institutions, it
is important not to manipulate the concept of territory to make the foreign
act extra-territorial and hence not subject to respect by a domestic court.
Effectuation of the viewpoint recommended here requires a search for
neutral jurisdictional formulas that associate activity with national ter-
ritory in a fashion as mechanical and uniform as possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no easy reconciliation of the national and international
character of domestic courts. A functional approach based upon spheres
of competence seems sensible, however, and leads to advocacy of judicial
independence for domestic courts in civil litigation involving the appli-
cation of rules of international law. Whatever contact such a case may
happen to have with the conduct of foreign relations reflects the special
character of the particular situation. The contact is not a reflection of
any functional overlap, as it is when courts are asked to decide upon
substantive matters that are necessarily within the sphere of foreign re-
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lations 4 Where the connection between judicial outcomes is contingent
and situational rather than necessary and functional, courts should serve
the cause of developing the international legal system by claiming auton-
omy for themselves and by rejecting all executive guidance.
But the achievement of judicial independence within the domestic
system is not an invitation to domestic courts to assume an overly activist
role when it becomes their duty to judge official acts of foreign sov-
ereigns by reference to substantive rules of international law. Instead,
a restrictive view of judicial function acknowledges the weakness of sub-
stantive international law in a world divided along ideological, cultural
and economic lines. Accordingly, the official action of a foreign govern-
ment should be treated as valid by a domestic court unless it violates a
substantive rule supported actively by a global consensus of states. The
absence of consensus with respect to many of the rules and standards
in the area of state responsibility compels a domestic court to abstain from
challenging the legality of the foreign government's official action. In
this way can domestic courts operate constructively, deferring in areas
of dissensus to the primacy of territorial supremacy, and implementing in
other areas an existing consensus established by reference to world com-
munity standards.
24. An example is the grant of a certificate of convenience and necessity to a
foreign airline or the prohibition of arms shipment to one faction in a foreign civil
war.
